We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis on the CDS-Bond basis trade and its implications for the pricing of corporate bonds. The basis trade attracts arbitrageurs to the corporate bond market, which has been dominated by buy-and-hold investors. The risks involved in the basis trade could a ect the pricing of corporate bonds through trading activities of the arbitrageurs.
Introduction
The credit derivatives markets have experienced tremendous growth during the past decade.
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the notional value of outstanding credit derivatives by the end of 2007 was 58 trillion dollars. Credit derivatives have fundamentally changed market practices in the investment, trading, and management of credit risk. Traditionally, institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, typically adopt a buy-andhold strategy in their investments in cash corporate bonds. Nowadays, speculators, such as hedge funds and proprietary trading desks of investment banks, can easily long and short the credit risk of individual companies or portfolios of companies using credit derivatives. 1 The single-name credit default swap (CDS) is the most liquid and popular product and accounts for more than two thirds of all outstanding credit derivatives. Since its rst appearance in late 1990s, CDS has been widely used to \arbitrage" the mispricing of the credit risk of the same company in the cash and derivatives markets through the so-called CDS-Bond basis trade.
The CDS-Bond basis (the basis hereafter) is de ned as the di erence between the CDS spread of a reference rm and the spread of the rm's cash corporate bond with similar maturity. Many studies have shown that CDS and bond spread should follow a co-integrated process since they measure the credit risk of the same company. 2 Investors can easily arbitrage away non-zero basis if the two markets are expected to converge in the future. When the basis is negative (positive), one can long (short) the underlying corporate bond and buy (sell) CDS to bet on the narrowing of the basis. Since it is generally more di cult to short corporate bonds, the negative basis trade has been more popular in practice.
Unlike standard textbook arbitrage, arbitrage in practice is always risky. Arbitrageurs in the basis trade face a wide variety of risks. First, non-zero basis could be due to contractual di erences between cash bond and CDS and does not necessarily represent pure arbitrage pro ts. Second, due to the well-known limits-to-arbitrage constraints of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), arbitrageurs could lose money even in potentially pro table trades. For example, levered arbitrageurs in the basis trade could face funding liquidity risk. Arbitrageurs could also face counterparty risk, mostly from sellers of CDS contracts, liquidity risks in both bond and CDS markets, as well as deleveraging risks from other levered players. Therefore, in practice, the basis trade is never a pure arbitrage, but a risky investment with its own risks and rewards. Given the dramatic disruptions in the credit market caused by the unwinding of the basis trade, in this paper, we study the potential impacts of the basis trade on the pricing of underlying cash corporate bonds. The basis arbitrage attracts arbitrageurs to a market, which has been dominated by buy-and-hold investors. Due to their passive strategies, the buy-and-hold investors are much less concerned about the risks involved in the basis trade than the arbitrageurs, whose pro ts and losses depend greatly on these risks. Consequently, the risks involved in the basis trade could a ect the pricing of cash corporate bonds through trading activities of the arbitrageurs.
The impact of the basis trade on corporate bond pricing could be non-trivial because the size of the corporate bond market is about only one-sixth of that of the CDS market in 2009 as shown in Figure 2 . 4 The impact that basis arbitrageurs have on corporate bond returns is very similar in spirit to the impact that foreign speculators have on emerging market equity returns documented in Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . While it is interesting to test whether each individual risk involved in the basis trade a ects corporate bond returns, it is very di cult to explicitly identify each risk component. 5 Instead we treat the basis as a convenient empirical proxy of all the risks involved in the basis trade and test whether it plays the role of a new risk factor for pricing corporate bonds.
Our paper provides several interesting new empirical ndings on the basis and its relation to both the time series and cross section of corporate bond returns. First, we provide one of the rst comprehensive empirical analyses on the time series and cross-sectional properties of the basis and its relation to bond characteristics and future bond returns. We compute the basis for each corporate bond in our sample using CDS spread from Markit and bond prices from TRACE and . 4 Intuitively, the expected return of a given asset mainly depends on its exposure to systematic risk factors that in uence the marginal rate of substitution (hereafter MRS) of the dominant investors in the asset. Without CDS, expected returns of cash corporate bonds should depend mainly on their exposures to risk factors that in uence the MRS of traditional buy-and-hold investors. With CDS and the basis trade, expected returns of corporate bonds should depend also on the risk factors that in uence the MRS of basis arbitrageurs. 5 For example, Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2010) nd that three major risks in the basis trade explain less than 40% of the whole basis.
time series average of the basis for individual bonds is negative at -37 basis points, suggesting a somewhat permanent discrepancy between CDS and bond spread. We nd that bonds with more negative basis tend to be older, have lower rating, longer maturity, higher coupon, duration, and convexity. In a time series setting, we also identify predictive power of the basis for future bond returns. The basis level is negatively related to future returns of individual bonds.
Second, we provide strong evidence that the basis is a new risk factor in explaining the cross section of expected corporate bond returns. We form ve bond portfolios based on past average basis and nd that the quintile basis portfolios earn signi cant abnormal returns, after controlling for well-documented systematic risk factors and bond characteristics in the literature. We show that a new basis risk factor, constructed as the return di erential between LOW and HIGH quintile basis portfolios, plays an important role in explaining the cross-sectional returns of twenty bond portfolios sorted on credit rating and maturity. Fama-MacBeth (1973) factors, such as the market and HML factor, exhibit negative risk premiums as well during the same time period. The negative basis risk premium indicates that the corporate bond market experienced signi cant price disruptions as it was abandoned by investors during the nancial crisis. The normal price-adjusting mechanism fails to correct for the mispricing of these bonds.
The heightened counterparty risk, funding risk, and uncertainty after the Lehman bankruptcy drive corporate bond prices far away from their fundamental values. Further forced sale of highly leveraged arbitrageurs in credit market drive the demand for corporate bonds further down. As a result, the risk premiums of the basis, market and HML factors are all extremely negative during the crisis. Our ndings here establish the severity of market imperfections in the corporate bond market during the nancial crisis.
There is a fast growing literature on CDS spread and the basis. While earlier studies mainly focus on the co-integration of CDS and bond spread, recent studies have examined the existence 7 We demonstrate that even after controlling for all the systematic risk and liquidity factors, the basis factor still carries signi cant positive risk premium during normal market conditions. Therefore, our paper identi es a new risk factor for corporate bond returns due to arbitrage activities involving credit derivatives and cash bonds.
Our study also sheds lights on the impacts of the introduction of derivatives and associated arbitrage activities on the pricing of the underlying securities. While many studies have examined the potential impacts of options on underlying securities, our paper is probably the rst to study the pricing impact of CDS and the basis trade on cash corporate bonds. While di erent studies, such as Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Duarte, Longsta , and Yu (2007) , have documented the risk and return properties of di erent arbitrage strategies, our paper is one of the rst that studies the pricing impacts of arbitrage activities on related securities. Our ndings show that the pricing impacts of the introduction of CDS and the basis arbitrage trade on the cross-sectional returns of corporate bonds are signi cant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the basis arbitrage trade and the risks involved. Section 3 describes the data and the construction of the basis. Section 4 documents the relation between the basis, bond characteristics, and future bond returns. Section 5 shows that the basis is a new risk factor in determining the cross-sectional returns of corporate bonds. Section 6 conducts robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
6 TERM is the di erence between long-term government bond return and the one-month Treasury bill rate, and DEF is the di erence between long-term corporate and government bond return. 2 The CDS-Bond Basis Arbitrage
The CDS-Bond Basis Trade
A CDS is essentially an insurance contract, in which the protection buyer pays a premium (called the CDS spread) to the protection seller periodically for protection against the default of a reference entity. A credit event, such as bankruptcy, triggers a contingent payment from the protection seller to the buyer. The payment could be in the form of physical settlement, in which the seller receives the defaulted bond and pays par to the buyer, or cash settlement, in which the seller pays the di erence between par and the recovery value of the bond. CDS makes it much more convenient to trade the credit risk of a reference entity. While in the past one has to borrow and sell the cash bond of a company to short its credit risk, right now this can be easily accomplished by buying the CDS of the company.
The basis is de ned as the di erence between the CDS spread and bond spread for the same company at the same maturity. Many studies argue that CDS and bond spread should be cointegrated because CDS and bond are two ways to invest in the credit risk of the same company and should have the same payo in either default and at maturity. Therefore, non-zero basis presents trading opportunities for arbitrageurs who expect the basis to narrow in the future.
When the basis is positive, the arbitrageur can short the cash bond, which is typically done through a reverse repo, and sell a CDS on the same reference name with the same maturity and notional amount. When the basis is negative, an arbitrageur can buy the cash bond (probably need to use repo to fund the purchase) and buy a CDS on the same reference name. In either case, the arbitrageur can probably hedge the interest rate risk embedded in cash bond by using some interest rate derivatives. The negative basis trade is more popular in practice since it is more di cult to short corporate bonds.
The basis trade was very popular among hedge funds and proprietary trading desks at Wall
Street rms before the current nancial crisis (see e.g., Choudhry, 2006 ; JP Morgan, 2006).
Traders, while deciding on candidate bonds for the basis trade, tend to consider bonds with funding spreads between -500bp and 1000 bps, which would rule out distressed and speculative grade bonds (see Deutsche Bank, 2009) . A positive funding spread can usually lead to a negative basis, which indicates that a bond is cheaper than CDS. During the few years before the crisis when credit was easily available, speculators tend to lever up the basis trade many times to magnify the pro ts from small price discrepancies.
Risks Involved in the Basis Trade
It is important to realize that non-zero basis may arise due to market imperfections and does not necessarily represent pure arbitrage pro ts. As pointed out by Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005), one main reason for non-zero basis is contractual di erences between cash bond and CDS contract. For example, one might not be able to nd a CDS with exactly the same maturity as the cash bond. Second, in case of default, although the accrued interest is paid upon default in CDS, it is not paid for defaulted bond. Moreover, the interest payment of CDS is on a quarterly frequency whereas it is semi-annual for most cash bonds. The cheapest-to-deliver option embedded in CDS contract can be extremely valuable in some default events. 8 Investors in CDS may not enjoy the same rights as those in cash corporate bonds either. Bolton and Oehmke (2010) highlight the empty creditor problem where debtholders with CDS protection might desire for quick bankruptcy resolution whereas it might hurt the rights of debtholders without CDS. The cash bond holder might prefer to restructure rather than bankruptcy resolution.
Non-zero basis could also be due to more e cient price discovery in the CDS market. Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that private information of informed banks tend to be re ected in CDS but not cash bond market. Alexopoulou, Andersson and Georgesu (2009) show that the CDS market usually lead corporate bond market in price discovery. But during the recent nancial crisis, the CDS market reacts more towards systematic risk whereas the corporate bond market reacts more to liquidity and idiosyncractic risk.
In addition to the above reasons for non-zero basis, arbitrageurs in the basis trade are also exposed to a wide variety of risks. One important risk is funding liquidity risk for arbitrageurs who purchase cash bonds using borrowed money. Margin requirements, perceived changes to margin requirements, terms of nancing, conditions under which nancing can be renewed or terminated, actual nancing cost (such as repo or reverse repo rate) are all important considerations for evaluating funding risk. Arbitrageurs also face counterparty risk in the basis trade, the majority of which arises from the default risk of protections sellers. When highly levered arbitrageurs face a sudden shortage of capital or funding liquidity, their deleveraging activities can a ect the basis level in a signi cant way, which could lead to deleveraging risk. The liquidity risks in both CDS and bond markets might a ect the unwinding of the basis arbitrage positions. 9 Lastly, it is possible that the underlying rms are selling the cash bond and their a liated nancial institutions are also the sellers of the CDS contract. Hence the default risk of the cash bond and the counterparty risk embedded in the CDS can be highly correlated.
While default risk can be hedged to some extent in the basis trade, it is di cult to completely 8 The option gives the buyer the right to deliver the cheapest bond for the single name entity when a credit event 
Summary Information of the Basis
The basis for a given rm i at time t for a given maturity is de ned as Basis i;t; = CDS i;t; Z i;t; ;
where CDS i;t; (Z i;t; ) is the CDS (bond) spread of rm i at time t for maturity . While there are many di erent ways to compute the bond spread, in our empirical analysis, we mainly use Z-spread, which has been widely used in industry in de ning the basis according to Choudhry (2006) . Z-spread is de ned as a parallel shift of the credit curve such that the present value of future cash ows equals to the current bond price. A simple de nition of the Z-spread for a three year plain vanilla bond with annual coupon is the value of Z that solves the following equation:
where P is the current price of the bond with face value of 1, c is the coupon rate, s i is the zero-coupon yield to maturity based on the swap rate curve. Robustness checks show that other measures of bond spread do not signi cantly a ect our results.
To construct the basis, we rst compute the Z-spread for each bond on each day in our dataset.
We then match the Z-spread with the CDS spread with the same maturity. In case we do not have the exact match for maturity, we linearly interpolate the CDS curve to obtain a CDS spread that has the same maturity as the bond. Then the basis for each bond is constructed by subtracting the Z-spread from the CDS spread. After matching and cleaning, our nal dataset has a total of 400,934 observations. The sample period is between January 2, 2001 and December 31, 2008. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the basis displays signi cant variation over time. 
The Basis, Bond Characteristics, and Future Bond Returns
In this section, we explore the relation between the basis and individual bond characteristics and future bond returns. We rst relate the basis to bond characteristics such as rating, maturity, age, coupon, issue size, duration, and convexity. Then we demonstrate that past basis can predict future individual bond returns at 20-, 40-and 60-day horizons based on cross-sectional regression analysis. The di erent holding periods approximate monthly, bi-monthly, and quarterly frequency in asset pricing tests. Table 2 provides summary information on the basis and documents the relation between the basis and various bond characteristics. We use Standard and Poor's (S&P) rating whenever available, followed by Moody's and Fitch's rating. We assign a value of 1 to the highest rating (AAA for S&P or Aaa for Moody's) and 10 to the lowest rating (BBB-for S&P or Baa3 for Moody's). We assign values between 2 and 9 for intermediate ratings.
Basis and Bond Characteristics
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the average bond in our sample has a rating between A and A-, To examine the relation between the basis and bond characteristics, we sort bonds into portfolios based on each of the characteristics and calculate the average basis in each portfolio. Panel B to H of Table 2 present the results based on rating, maturity, age, coupon, issue size, duration, and convexity, respectively. Panel B documents a monotonic relation between rating and the basis, i.e., the lower the rating, the more negative the basis. For example, the basis decreases from -3.8 bps for AAA-rated bonds to -50.3 bps for BBB-rated bonds. The average basis of each rating class is statistically signi cantly di erent from zero at the 1% signi cance level. The standard deviation of the basis is also higher for lower-rated bonds. In sum, our comprehensive empirical analysis identi es a clear relation between the basis and bond characteristics: Bonds with more negative basis tend to be older and have lower rating, longer maturity, higher coupon, higher duration and convexity.
Basis and Future Bond Returns
In this section, we study the predictive power of the basis for future bond returns. If we interpret the basis as a re ection of all the risks involved in the basis trade, then investors should be compensated in future bond returns by investing in the basis. In other words, we expect current negative basis leads to higher future bond returns.
For each bond i, we compute its k-day holding period return HP R i;t;t+k using the following equation HP R i;t;t+k = (P i;t+k + AI i;t+k ) + C i;t;t+k (P i;t + AI i;t ) P i;t + AI i;t ; k = 20; 40; 60;
where P i;t+k is the closest available transaction price of bond i on day t + k, AI i;t+k is the accrued interest on day t + k, C i;t;t+k is the coupon payment during the period from day t to t + k, P i;t is the closest available transaction price on day t, and AI i;t is the accrued interest on day t. 10 We consider the following Fama-MacBeth regression of future individual bond excess returns on its past basis, bond characteristics, and three liquidity measures:
where HP R i;t;t+k is the k-day (where k = 20, 40, and 60) holding period return for bond i from day t to t + k, r f;t;t+k is the cumulative risk free rate from day t to t + k, BASIS i;t , RAT IN G i;t , T T M i;t , AGE i;t , C i;t , and ISSU E i;t are the basis, rating, maturity, age, coupon, and issue size of bond i at time t; respectively, IN DLIQ1 k i;t is the sum of the logarithm of the total number of transactions for bond i between day t k and day t, IN DLIQ2 k i;t is the sum of the logarithm of the total trading volume of bond i between day t k and day t, and IN DLIQ3 k i;t is the sum of the turnover of bond i that is de ned as the total trading volume divided by the total number outstanding for the bond between day t k and day t. We run cross-sectional regression on each day and report the time series averages of the estimates of the coe cients. Robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics of coe cients are reported in brackets. The results are reported in regression speci cation (1) in Table 3 . For robustness checks, we replace age and maturity by duration in regression speci cation (2) in Table 3 .
Panels A, B and C of Table 3 for the two speci cations. This suggests that negative basis leads to higher future bond returns.
On the other hand, the coe cients of other bond characteristics, such as credit rating, maturity, age, duration, and liquidity factors, are not consistently signi cant across di erent regression speci cations. Panel B shows that the basis still has signi cant predictive power for future bond return with a negative coe cient at 40-day holding horizon for both model speci cations. Similar results hold for 60-day holding period returns under the rst regression speci cation as reported in Panel C. Overall, our results show that the basis has predictive power for future excess returns of individual bonds after controlling for well-known bond characteristics and liquidity measures.
Is the Basis a New Risk Factor for Corporate Bond Returns?
In this section, we study whether the basis is a new risk factor for determining corporate bond returns. We rst construct quintile bond portfolios sorted on past basis and test whether existing asset pricing models for corporate bonds can capture the returns of the quintile basis portfolios.
Then we construct a basis risk factor by taking a long position in the lowest basis quintile portfolio and shorting the highest basis quintile portfolio. We show that the basis risk factor is not linearly related to bond characteristics and cannot be fully captured by existing systematic risk factors.
Finally, we show that the new basis risk factor helps explaining the cross-sectional returns of twenty corporate bond portfolios sorted on rating and maturity. Due to the dramatic disruptions in the corporate bond market during the current nancial crisis, we conduct our asset pricing 
Return and Risk of the Quintile Basis Portfolios
We form quintile portfolios of bonds based on their past basis and examine their subsequent returns over di erent holding periods. We also investigate whether existing asset pricing models for corporate bonds can capture time variations of the returns of the quintile basis portfolios.
We sort bonds into ve basis portfolios based on the average basis of each bond over the past 60 trading days. A bond is included in our sample only if it has more than 20 transactions during the past 60 trading days. We then compute the subsequent equal-or value-weighted k-day holding period returns of each basis portfolio on day t, HP R t;t+k ; where k = 20, 40, and 60 days.
We further eliminate dates with less than ve bonds traded. Our re ned sample is from July 60-day holding periods, respectively. After obtaining individual bond holding period returns, we then compute equal-and value-weighted holding period returns for the ve basis portfolios. We compute value-weighted portfolio return by weighting each bond's holding period return by the ratio of its market value to the total market value of all the bonds within the portfolio.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the raw and excess holding period returns of the ve equal-weighted basis portfolios. The excess return is the di erence between the raw return and the risk free rate during the same holding period. On average each basis portfolio contains about 35 bonds. The levels of the basis of the ve portfolios range from -75 bps (LOW) to 18 bps (HIGH) within the past 60-day window. We nd that the LOW basis portfolio has signi cantly higher raw and excess returns than the HIGH basis portfolio over all three holding periods. The return di erentials between the LOW and HIGH basis portfolios are statistically signi cant at the 1% level and amount to 28 bps, 49 bps, and 65 bps for 20-, 40-, and 60-day holding period, respectively. On an annual basis, the return di erentials range from 2.69% to 3.52%, an economically signi cant number. Panel B of Table 4 reports the raw and excess holding period returns of the ve valueweighted basis portfolios. The return di erentials between the LOW and HIGH basis portfolios range from 2.19% to 2.74% on an annual basis.
Next we investigate whether existing asset pricing models can explain the returns of the ve basis portfolios. Table 5 reports the following time series regressions of the returns of the ve basis portfolios on the ve systematic factors in Fama and French (1993) and four bond liquidity factors:
where HP R p;t k;t is the k-day holding period return of the basis bond portfolio p from day t k to t (p = 1; 2; : : : ; 5; and k = 20; 40; or 60), r f;t k;t is the cumulative risk-free rate from day t k to t, is the intercept that represents abnormal return, M KT k t , SM B k t , and HM L k t are the three standard factors used in Fama and French (1993) from day t k to day t, DEF k t and T ERM k t are the two standard bond factors of Fama and French (1993) from day t k to day t; LIQ1 k t measures the aggregate liquidity of the corporate bond market as the logarithm of the total number of all corporate bond transactions from day t k to day t, LIQ2 k t is the logarithm of the total trading volume of all corporate bonds from day t k to day t, LIQ3 k t measures the turnover in the bond market as the ratio of total trading volume divided by the total number of bonds outstanding from day t k to day t, and LIQ4 k t is the Amihud (2002) liquidity risk factor measured from day t k to day t. The rst three liquidity measures represent the level of the liquidity risk, whereas the Amihud (2002) measure is the systematic liquidity risk in the whole corporate bond market. We follow the procedures in Lin, Wang and Wu (2010) to construct the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure for the corporate bond market. In addition, we demean all these risk factors so that we can interpret the intercepts as abnormal returns in later asset pricing tests.
Panel A of Table 5 In summary, Table 5 shows that the LOW basis portfolio has signi cantly higher subsequent abnormal returns than the HIGH basis portfolio across all holding horizons. Moreover, the LOW and HIGH basis portfolios have very di erent exposures to systematic risk factors at di erent time horizons.
The Basis Risk Factor and Bond Characteristics
Following the convention of the asset pricing literature, we use a zero-investment portfolio that longs the LOW quintile basis portfolio and shorts the HIGH quintile portfolio as a proxy for the basis risk factor. We rst explore the relation between the new basis risk factor and the bond characteristics considered before. We sort all bonds into di erent characteristic groups and within each group, we form the LOW-minus-HIGH (LMH) basis portfolio and report its equal-and value-weighted 20-, 40-, and 60-day holding period returns in Table 6 .
Panel A of This result is consistent with Figure 1 , which shows that the negative basis widens even further in 2008 from very negative levels at the beginning of the crisis. Therefore, the tightening of credit and unwinding of basis trade positions during the crisis can lead to big losses in the basis trade that is conventionally pro table in normal times.
Panel B of Table 6 shows that the LMH strategy is pro More important, the return of the LMH portfolio is highest for AA-rated bond portfolios, lowest for liquid bond portfolios with medium time to maturity, duration and convexity, intermediate level of coupons, and large issue size. These results suggest that it is di cult to reduce the basis measure to any single source of risk. Instead, the basis factor measures all the risks involved in the basis arbitrage trade, which could include counterparty risk, funding risk, liquidity risk, and residual default risk among others.
The Basis as a New Risk Factor for Corporate Bond Returns
In this section, we test explicitly whether the LMH basis factor, constructed as return di erential between the LOW and HIGH basis portfolios, plays the role of a new risk factor for corporate We perform the following rolling regression for each of the twenty rating-maturity bond portfolio q to obtain the betas of the all the factors over the past 180 trading days, HP R q;t k;t r f;t k;t = q;k + b;q;k BASIS k t + m;q;k M KT k t + size;q;k SM B k t
where HP R q;t k;t is the k-day holding period return of bond portfolio q (which is formed based on rating and maturity and q = 1; 2; :::; 20) from day t k to t (where k = 20; 40; or 60), BASIS k t is the k-day holding period return of the basis factor from day t k to t, and all the other risk factors are de ned as before, b;q;k is the beta for the basis risk factor for portfolio q for time horizon k, m;q;k is the market beta, size;q;k is the size beta, bm;q;k is the BM beta, d;q;k is the default beta, t;q;k is the term beta, and l i ;q;k are the four liquidity betas for i = 1; 2; 3 and 4.
After obtaining the estimated betas from equation (6), we run the following regression to obtain estimates of the risk premium for each of the risk factors:
HP R q;t;t+k r f;t;t+k = q;k + b b;q;k BASIS k + b m;q;k M KT k + b size;q;k SM B k
where HP R q;t;t+k represents the realized return of bond portfolio q from day t to day t + k and is a proxy for the expected return on day t till day t + k (where q = 1; 2; : : : ; 20; and k = 20; 40;
or 60), b b;q;k is the estimated beta for the basis risk factor for portfolio q for the time horizon k from the rst-stage time series regression, b m;q;k is the estimated market beta, b size;q;k is the estimated size beta, b bm;q;k is the estimated BM beta, b d;q;k is the estimated default beta, b t;q;k is the estimated term beta, and b l i ;q;k are the estimated four liquidity betas. Hence, the regression results from equation (7) report the risk premiums of the ten systematic risk factors. Table 7 reports the empirical results of our asset pricing tests. Panel A of Table 7 on an annual basis. On average, the six weighting schemes give an annual basis risk premium of 3%. Moreover, the new basis risk factor is the only risk factor that is statistically signi cant across all time horizons and all weighting schemes. This result con rms our conjecture that the basis risk factor plays an important role in explaining the expected returns of corporate bonds after CDS becomes available. Di erent from the other nine factors that have been documented in the literature, the basis risk factor is mainly driven by the introduction of credit derivatives and the related basis arbitrage trade.
Results During the Financial Crisis (2007-2008)
In this section, we report the results for the asset pricing tests during the current nancial crisis Panel F reports the results of the ten-factor asset pricing model and shows that the basis risk premium is also signi cantly negative, ranging from -3.92% to -10.69% on an annual basis (about -8.01% on average). The negative risk premiums for existing systematic risk factors imply that the nancially-constrained bond investors are willing to take huge price discounts to cash out from the credit market even though they know that the expected return in the long-run can be positive if they can hold on to their investments. Since standard asset pricing theory requires systematic risk factors to earn positive risk premium, we interpret the negative risk premium as a result of the failure of the market self-adjusting mechanism during the extreme turmoils of the current nancial crisis.
During the crisis, the terms and availability of nancing deteriorate signi cantly, which dramatically reduce the demand for the basis trade. Moreover, many levered players in the trade have been forced to unwind their positions due to the tightening of credit. As a result, the basis widens and becomes hugely negative in the height of the crisis. As shown in Figure 1 On the other hand, the potential cash-rich investors are reluctant to step in to bring the price back to its fundamental value. They also enter into a massive fear as they are not sure whether the market might collapse and they might lose all their investments. The joint e ects of deleveraging by the nancial-constrained arbitrageurs and fearful investors make the prices of corporate bonds deviate signi cantly from their equilibrium values for a prolonged period. Only when the government steps in to restore the con dence in the nancial system, the bond market starts to revert back to its equilibrium level.
In summary, our results provide strong evidence that the basis risk is a new risk factor for the expected corporate bond returns even after controlling for well-known risk factors documented by Fama and French (1993) and Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan (2005) . This is the rst study, as far as we know, that shows clearly how corporate bond market can be a ected by the introduction of credit derivatives and the associated arbitrage activities.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we provide robustness checks of the main results of our paper. We rst examine whether our results are sensitive to other ways of measuring the basis. Then we test whether the new basis factor is simply a proxy of funding liquidity risk (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
Alternative Measures of the Basis
In the above analysis, we convert corporate bond price into a spread (Z-spread) and compare that with CDS spread to obtain the basis. 11 Alternatively we can convert CDS spread into a bond-equivalent price and compare that with cash corporate bond price. We adopt the C-spread approach of Choudhry (2006) , who believes it is one of the most e ective ways of measuring the basis. One important advantage of this approach is that it explicitly takes into account of variations of default risk over time by backing out the default probability from the term structure of CDS spreads. 12 We rst derive a cumulative default probability curve from the term structure of CDS spreads of a reference credit. Assuming a 40% recovery rate (industry convention), we construct a survival curve by bootstrapping the cumulative default probabilities. We then use the survival curve to price the corporate bond using a binomial tree model. Coupons and principal are the nodes of the cash ow tree. Each node of the tree has two possible outcomes: default or survival. Cash ows along the tree are then discounted using the corresponding zero yield implied from the swap curve to obtain the hypothetical price of the bond, which can be interpreted as the price of the CDS if it were traded as a bond. Finally, we obtain the C-spread by computing the necessary parallel shift of the swap curve that equates the hypothetical bond price to its market price.
We use the di erence between C-spread and Z-spread as the new de nition of the basis, based on which we sort all bonds into ve portfolios. We use the return di erential between the LOW and HIGH basis portfolios as the new basis risk factor. Asset pricing tests based on the new risk factor are reported in Panels A and B of 11 We do not consider asset swap spread (Choudhry, 2006 ) and I-spread (JP Morgan, 2006), which are also used in industry to compute the basis, due to their various drawbacks. 12 It is much easier to use CDS term structure to back out default probabilities than bond term structure due to limited data on bond transactions.
respectively. Panel A of Table 7 .
In sum, di erent measures of the basis have little impacts on our main ndings. The basis risk premium is positive during the normal period and negative during the crisis period. The basis risk premium is statistically signi cantly di erent from zero for equal-and value-weighted portfolios across all holding horizons.
Funding Liquidity
In this section, we test whether the basis risk factor is simply a proxy of funding liquidity risk that has been discussed in the literature. potentially be an important missing aggregate risk factor that commands a risk premium.
We incorporate several proxies for funding liquidity risk in our analysis and show that our main ndings are not a ected. Panels A and B of Table 9 show that when TED spread (the di erence between 3-month uncollateralized LIBOR rate and 3-month T-bill rate) is included in our asset pricing tests as a proxy for funding liquidity risk, the basis risk premium on average is 
Speculative Grade Bonds
According to Deutsche Bank (2009), arbitrageurs tend to favor investment grade bonds over speculative grade bonds when conducting the basis trade. As a result, we do not expect the basis risk to play an important role for pricing speculative grade bonds. Table 10 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have identi ed a new risk factor, the basis factor, for pricing corporate bonds. In contrast to traditional fundamental corporate bond risk factors, the basis factor a ects corporate bond returns only after the introduction of CDS and the associated CDS-Bond basis arbitrage trade. The basis factor, constructed as the return di erential between LOW and HIGH quintile basis portfolios, is priced in the cross section of investment grade bonds with an annual risk premium of about 3% in normal periods. Our result shows that the introduction of CDS has fundamentally changed the pricing of cash corporate bonds. It also highlights the inter-connections of global nancial markets. Just like foreign speculators can a ect emerging market equity returns as documented in Bekaert and Harvey (2000) , arbitrageurs in credit derivatives can a ect the pricing of cash corporate bonds through their trading activities. Hopefully these e ects can be incorporated more explicitly into future asset pricing theories.
[ Table 2 .
Bond Characteristics and the CDS-Bond Basis
The table reports the relation between the basis and various bond characteristics, such as rating, maturity, age, coupon, size, duration and convexity. Panel A reports summary information of the basis and bond characteristics. Bond ratings are categorized from 1 to 10 for all investment grade bonds (S&P ratings AAA to BBB-). We use the S&P ratings whenever available, followed by Table 3 .
The CDS-Bond Basis and Future Individual Bond Returns
The table reports the predicting power of the CDS-Bond basis for future individual bond returns. We run a standard Fama-Macbeth regression on future individual bond returns at 20-day (Panel A), 40-day (Panel B) and 60-day (Panel C) horizon from day t onwards. Future return is the excess return of the holding period return for each bond by subtracting the risk-free return. In addition to the basis, we consider the follow bond characteristics: rating, maturity, age, duration, coupon, issue size (defined as the logarithm of the issue amount), and liquidity on day t. INDLIQ1_k is the sum of the logarithm of the total number of transactions for the individual bond from day t-k to t.
INDLIQ2_k is the sum of the logarithm of the total trading volume of the individual bond from day t-k to t.
INDLIQ3_k is the sum of the turnover of the individual bond defined as the total trading volume divided by the total number outstanding for the bond from day t-k to t. We use the demeaned value of coupon, INDLIQ1_k, INDLIQ2_k, INDLIQ3_k for the time-series regression. Bond ratings are numbered from one to ten for investment grade bonds (S&P ratings, AAA to BBB-). The basis is in percentage terms. Maturity, age, and duration are in years. An adjusted R square term is in percentage. An ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 4 .
Returns of the Quintile Basis Portfolios
The table reports the average holding period returns (HPR) of five basis portfolios sorted on past 60-day basis. We delete trading days with less than five bonds traded, and our sample period is shortened to the period between 17 July 2002 and 31 December 2008. The quintile portfolios are sorted from the lowest (quintile 1) to the highest (quintile 5) basis. For each quintile, we compute the holding period returns for 20-, 40-and 60-day horizons. All portfolios are rebalanced daily and are equal-weighted (in Panel A) or value-weighted (in Panel B) by market capitalization, which is calculated from the last available transaction price of the bond. To be included in the quintile portfolios, bonds must have more than 20 trades in past 60 trading days. When computing the holding period return for the basis portfolio, we use the starting price from the formation date t whenever available, followed by the latest price with a five-day window prior to the formation date. We use the end transaction price from day t+k (where k = 20, 40, 60 respectively) whenever available, followed by the last available transaction price within five day before day t+k. Bonds without the starting and ending prices are eliminated from the analysis. There are 258,514, 252,850, and 252,540 observations for 20 day, 40 day, and 60 day HPR, respectively. We report both raw and excess returns for three different holding periods. The row '1-5' refers to the difference in returns between basis portfolio 1 and 5. Basis and returns are in percentage terms. There are about 35 bonds in each quintile portfolio. The t-statistics are reported in square bracket. An ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The table reports time series regressions of the returns of the quintile basis portfolios on existing systematic risk factors for corporate bonds. We delete trading days with less than five bonds traded, and our sample period is from to 17 July 2002 to 31 December 2008. The quintile portfolios are sorted from the lowest (quintile 1) to highest (quintile 5) basis based on the average basis of past 60 days. The holding period return is the return from the portfolio formation date to the end of the holding period (20, 40 and 60 days, respectively). In Panel A, we report the correlations among the following risk factors: TERM, DEF, MKT, SMB, and HML. MKT, SMB, and HML are the usual stock market risk factors downloaded from Kenneth French's website at daily frequency. TERM is the difference between the daily return of the 10-year-to-maturity government bond index and the daily T-bill return (from Kenneth French's website). DEF is the difference between the daily return of the Lehman investment grade bond index return from Datastream and the daily 10-year-to-maturity government bond return from CRSP. We compute the value of these risk factors for a time horizon of k (where k = 20, 40, and 60, respectively). MKT_k is the cumulative excess daily market return from day t-k to t. SMB_k, HML_k, TERM_k, and DEF_k are defined similarly. LIQ1_k is the sum of the logarithm of the total number of all corporate bond transactions on from day t-k to t. LIQ2_k is the sum of the logarithm of the total trade volume of all corporate bonds from day t-k to t. LIQ3_k is the sum of the turnover defined as the total trading volume divided by the total number outstanding for all corporate bonds from day t-k to t. LIQ4_k is the Amihud bond market liquidity risk factor, in which k (= 20, 40, or 60) represents the number of days used to calculate the price impact relative to the volume. The equal-weighted (valueweighted) averaging is used to aggregate individual bonds liquidity to market level liquidity when equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio returns are tested. We use the demeaned value of risk factors for the time-series regression. Panel B reports summary statistics of all the factors. All factors except for LIQ1_k, LIQ2_k, and LIQ3_k factors are in percentage terms. Panel C, D, and E report time series regressions of 20-, 40-, and 60-day HPR of the quintile basis portfolios on all the risk factors, respectively. We report results for both equal-and value-weighted returns. The row labeled '1-5' refers to the differences of intercept and slope coefficients between portfolio 1 and portfolio 5. An ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 5 . We construct three basis factors (BASIS_k, where k = 20, 40, 60) by forming the LMH portfolio as specified in Table 6 and use the LMH's equal-or value-weighted HPR from day t-k to t for the equal-or value-weighted portfolios of test assets. We use all the systematic risk factors from day t-k to t to price the twenty portfolios for their future returns from day t to t+k (where k = 20, 40, and 60, respectively) as a proxy for the expected returns of the portfolios. Panel The table reports the asset pricing tests by using the adjusted basis, which is the difference between CDS adjusted spread (i.e. C-spread) and Z-spread of the bonds according to Choudhry (2006) . The risk factors BASIS_k, MKT_k, SMB_k, HML_k, TERM_k, DEF_k, LIQ1_k, LIQ2_k, LIQ3_k, and LIQ4_k are defined in Table 5 The table reports asset pricing tests that control for funding liquidity. Two proxies are used for funding liquidity: TED spread, defined as 3-month uncollateralized LIBOR rate minus 3-month T-bill rate, and LIBOR-REPO spread, defined as 3-month uncollateralized LIBOR rate minus 3-month general collateral Repo rate. The risk factors BASIS_k, MKT_k, SMB_k, HML_k, TERM_k, DEF_k, LIQ1_k, LIQ2_k, LIQ3_k, and LIQ4_k are defined in Table 5 Table 5 
